Nietzsche wants to move beyond simple concepts of good and evil, abandon the assessment of individuals through ressentiment, and restore men to their former wonderful ability.
However, the question of the essay is: “How does the dystopian concept of Brave New World ends up when compared with the relevant ideas of Nietzsche’s - are they similar, different or in opposition?” Nietzsche also wrote about the need for Übermenschen, as well as weaker underlings for retaining the stability in the society and the radical removal of the old ethics and morality....
Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche ..
One recent development in analytic ethical theory has been a revivalof divine command theory parallel to the revival of natural law theorythat I have already described. A pioneer in this revival was PhilipQuinn's Divine Command and Moral Requirements (1978). Hedefended the theory against the usual objections (one, deriving fromPlato's Euthyprho, that it makes morality arbitrary, and thesecond, deriving from a misunderstanding of Kant, that it isinconsistent with human autonomy), and proposed that we understand therelation between God and moral rightness causally, rather thananalyzing the terms of moral obligation as meaning‘commanded by God’. Though we could stipulate such adefinition, it would make it obscure how theists and non-theists couldhave genuine moral discussion, as they certainly seem to do. RobertM. Adams, in a series of articles and then in Finite and InfiniteGoods (1999), first separates off the good (which he analyzesPlatonically in terms of imitating the ultimate good, which is God)and the right. He then defends a divine command theory of the right byarguing that obligation is always obligation to someone, andGod is the most appropriate person, given human limitations. JohnHare, InGod and Morality (2007) and Divine Command (2015),defends a version of the theory that derives from God's sovereigntyand defends the theory against the objection that obedience to divinecommand itself requires justification. He also compares Christian,Jewish and Muslim accounts of divine command. Thomas L. Carson'sValue and the Good Life (2000) argues that normative theoryneeds to be based on an account of rationality, and then proposes thata divine-preference account of rationality is superior to all theavailable alternatives. An objection to divine command theory ismounted by Mark Murphy's An Essay on Divine Authority (2002)and God and Moral Law (2012) on the grounds that divinecommand only has authority over those persons that have submittedthemselves to divine authority, but moral obligation has authoritymore broadly. William Wainwright's Religion and Moralitydefends the claim that divine command theory provides a moreconvincing account of moral obligation than any virtue-based theory,including Zagzebski's divine motivation theory, discussedearlier. Finally, C. Stephen Evans, in Kierkegaard's Ethics ofLove: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (2004) andGod and Moral Obligation(2013) articulates both inKierkegaard and in its own right a divine command theory that isargued to be superior to all the main alternative non-theist accountsof the nature and basis of moral obligation.