Malaysia’s former prime minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, was presumably far more sober than Mr. Gibson when he spoke at the Conference for the Support of Al-Quds on January 21, 2010. Yet, sobriety did not inhibit his declaration that “Even after their massacre by the Nazis of Germany, they [Jews] survived to continue to be a source of even greater problems for the world.”
If the view that emotions are a kind of perception can be sustained,then the connection between emotion and cognition will have beensecured. But there is yet another way of establishing this connection,compatible with the perceptual model. This is to draw attention to therole of emotions as providing the framework for cognitions of the moreconventional kind. de Sousa (1987) and Amélie Rorty (1980)propose this sort of account, according to which emotions are not somuch perceptions as they are ways of seeing—species ofdeterminate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines ofinquiry, and inferential strategies (see also Roberts 2003). Emotionsmake certain features of situations or arguments more prominent,giving them a weight in our experience that they would have lacked inthe absence of emotion. Consider how Iago proceeds to make Othellojealous. He directs Othello's attention, suggests questions to ask,and insinuates that there are inferences to be drawn withoutspecifying them himself. Once Othello's attention turns to his wife'sfriendship with Cassio and the lost handkerchief, inferences which onthe same evidence would not even have been thought of before are nowexperienced as compelling: “Farewell, the tranquilmind….”
Robert C. Solomon, A Better Way to Think About …
The Australian philosopher Tony Coady probably speaks for most philosophers whenhe writes, "Dishonesty has always been perceived in our culture, and in allcultures but the most bizarre, as a central human vice." But, he adds, "we shouldnote that this perception is consistent with a certain hesitancy about whatconstitutes a lie and with the more than sneaking suspicion that there might be anumber of contexts in which lying is actually justified." Plato defended "thenoble lie," and the English ethicist Henry Sidgwick suggested that a "high-mindedlie" in the direction of humility might do us all a great deal of good.
Absolutely Yours, Hegel | by Robert C. Solomon | The …
• Cox, Damian, Marguerite La Caze and Michael P. Levine, Integrity and the Fragile Self (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) 179.9 COX 2003
• Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 174.4 SOL
• Brown, Marvin T. Corporate Integrity: Rethinking Organizational Ethics and Leadership (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 174.4 BRO 2005
A prominent philosophical exponent is Robert C
The Hellenistic philosophers' observations about nasty emotions arenot wholly compelling. Surely it is possible to see at least someemotions as having a positive contribution to make to our moral lives,and indeed we have seen that the verdict of cognitive science is thata capacity for normal emotion appears to be a sine qua non for therational and moral conduct of life. Outside of this intimate but stillsomewhat mysterious link between the neurological capacity for emotionand rationality, the exact significance of emotions to the moral lifewill again depend on one's theory of the emotions. Inasmuch asemotions are partly constituted by desires, as some cognitivisttheorists maintain, they will, as David Hume contended, help tomotivate decent behavior and cement social life. If emotions areperceptions, and can be more or less epistemically adequate to theirobjects, then emotions may have a further contribution to make to themoral life, depending on what sort of adequacy and what sort ofobjects are involved. Max Scheler (1954) was the first to suggest thatemotions are in effect perceptions of “tertiary qualities”that supervene in the (human) world on facts about social relations,pleasure and pain, and natural psychological facts, a suggestionrecently elaborated by Tappolet (2000).
Books by Author Robert C Solomon - Direct Textbook
In recent years, a notable development in philosophical treatmentof emotions has been the attempt to incorporate interdisciplinaryapproaches and insights into philosophy. Paul Griffiths (1997), JessiePrinz (2004), Craig DeLancey (2002), Tim Schroeder (2004) are amongthe most vigorous exponents of the view that philosophical work on theemotions must be re-oriented away from linguistic analysis and morerichly rooted in science. Robert Solomon, who spurred both interestand opposition with his provocative thesis that emotions arejudgments, also advocated an enrichment of emotion theory throughcross-cultural perspectives and the integration of scientificperspectives (Solomon 1999). Under the impact of explosive progress inbrain science, there has been renewed interest in the hypothesis thatinnate emotional temperament, as well as social environment, conditionpeople's moral and political stance. Emotional dispositions, in turn,have been linked via neuro-transmitters to specific genes (Canli andLesch 2007). At the same time, the influence of social environment andideology has been studied in increasingly greater depth. The view thatemotions are “socially constructed” and partly conditioned by ideologycan now be supported by more solid empirical work: what is experiencedas a quintessentially individual and psychological process, namelylove, is conditioned by an ideology that depends on social andeconomic factors (Ben Ze'ev and Goussinsky 2008; Illouz2012). More traditional perspectives continue to thrive, notably inthe defense, by David Pugmire (2005) and others, of a broadlyAristotelian point of view on the moral importance of integrity inemotions. There has also been increasing attention paid to the centralrole of emotions in psychiatry (Blair, Mitchell, and Blair2005; Charland 2010), in law and politics (Finkel and Parrott2006; Deigh 2008), and in religion (Roberts 2007).